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MORTALITY CONT~GENT CLAIMS,
HEALTH CARE, AND SOCIAL ~SUR4NCE
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the savings and health care impacts of mortali~ coniirzgenf claims,
defined here as income measures, such as annuities and life-insurance, under which earned income
is contingent on the length of one’s life. The postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life-
insurance programs, as well as the rapid increase in life-expectancy, motivates a better understanding
of the effects that mortality contingent claims have on resources devoted to life-extension. We
analyze the incentives that such claims imply for life-extension when resources may affect mortality
endogenously and argue that these incentives dramatically alter the standard conclusions obtained











1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 606371 Introduction
The number of countries that have old age or survivor income programs
provided through the public sector has increased by almost five times since
1940—from 33 to 155.1 Although the financing of these programs varies
widely across countries, the benefits are paid out almost exclusively in terms
of annuities and they often cover more than 90 percent of the labor force2.
Furthermore, private pensions add to the degree of annuitization of most
elderly populations. Public annuity programs are large, both in terms of
levels and growth: in OECD countries they constitute about one-tenth of
GDP, make up more than three-quarters of all social insurance in developed
countries, and have contributed to a quarter of the growth in total public
expenditures since 1960.3 As a consequence, small mortality effects have large
impacts on public expenditures: in the U. S., an extra year of living would
increase outlays by, at least, the annual size of Medicare and Social Security,
about one-third of total federal expenditures. Understanding the impact of
such programs on investment in health is thereby important for assessing the
relationship between the dramatic increase in old-age life-expectancy, the
postwar growth in mandatory annuity programs, and the rapid development
of medical care to extend the length of life.
In this paper we study the impact of mortality contingent claims on sav-
ings and investment in health human capital. Mortality contingent claims are
defined as any type of financial arrangements that generate income dependent
on the length of one’s life and include, for example, annuities ~life-insurance,
Iwe are thankful to Michael Boozer, David Bradford, Paul Gertler, James Heckman)
Magnus Johannesson, Casey Mulligan, Sherwin Rosen, Jose Scheinkman, as well as sem-
inar participants at the University of Chicago, NBER Summer Institute on Social Insur-
ance, the 7th Annual Health Economics Conference at Boston University, the Stockholm
School of Economics, and the Western Economic Association Meetings for comments.
John Cawley and Tom Lawless provided valuable research assistance. Financial support
for this project was provided by the John M. Olin Foundation, to which both authors are
thankful.
2For the median household in the U.S., public annuities are the biggest component of
wealth: about 60 percent of median wealth is social security wealth, about 25 percent
housing, with the remainder being partly annuitized through private pensions.
3see e.g., o[deT WorkeTs, RetaTernent,and Pensions (1995), U.S. Department of
Comme’rce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, and Lije-
Susi!aining Technologies and the E/deTly (1987), Office of Technology Assessment, Congress
of the United States, Washington, D.C.
1reverse mortgages, and various forms of survivor benefits in pension plans.
Our main argument is that mortality contingent claims have important in-
centive effects on investments in health and that these incentives raise a rich
set of unexplored questions. Although conventional analysis of these issues4
by economists assumes mortality to be exogenously determined, and thus not
affected by health investments, we argue that the rapid increases in expendi-
tures on medical care inputs is very hard to interpret without treating mor-
tality as endogenous. A major point we stress is that under such endogenous
mortality, there are feed-back effects between the two largest public programs
in many countries—health care services and old-age annuities; Medicare and
Social Security in the US.
Section 2 sets forth our basic model of life-extension, in which length of
life may be extended through costly medical care or other resources. Many
economists seem to stress that since medical care is often highly subsidized,
maximum life-extension will always take place when feasible. This ignores
that extending life involves large private costs such as e.g. reduced quality
of life (e. g., pain), foregone bequests, and time transfers from spouses or
children. Other costs include life-extending lifestyles, diets, prescriptions, or
experimental therapies, which also contribute to costs beyond simply subsi-
dized hospital and physician services. 5 These private costs affects the tradeoff
between living well versus living long because life-extension reduces resources
available for consumption but increases the time to consume. We argue that
this tradeoff is central for assessing the impact of mortality contingent claims
on savings or investments in health.
When a claim is contingent on mortality alone, it is incomplete with
respect to morbidity and we consider the effects of this incompleteness on
life-extension. First, we argue that public annuities induce excessive life-
expectancy. An extreme, but illustrative, example of this incentive effect is
financing the co-payment for a person’s life-support machine with his So-
cial Security pay. More generally, annuities are piece-rate incentives for
life-extending health investments. As a consequence, mandatory annuities
have some unrecognized welfare losses because they distort life-expectancy
upwards as a life is more valuable to extend when one has not run out of
4See e.g. the references in Kotlikoff (1989), Hurd (1990), or Posner (1995),
sIndeed the fact that sellers of annuities and life-insurance do not price discriminate I
medical insurance or living wills but do discriminate on behavior not related to medical care
(e.g., smoking) also suggests that there is a large behavioral component in life-extension.
2savings. Second, if income is more valuable when healthy than when sick),
the morbidity incompleteness of annuities implies that a very sick individual
has nothing better to spend annuitized income on than futile attempts to im-
prove his health.G These two annuity-induced effects on health investments,
we believe, are particularly relevant to the recent explosion in mandatory
annuity incomes, health care out lays, and life-expect ancy at the end of life.
Section 3 considers the non-standard interactions between public and pri-
vate savings under a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) Social Security program under
endogenous mort ality. Contrary to the case when mortality is exogenous, our
model explains why private savings may respond positively to expansions in
mandatory savings programs. 7 An important factor determining the comple-
mentary nature of private and public savings is whether the public savings
are life-extending. If they are, more private savings may be needed to finance
old age living. A somewhat self-evident example is mandatory savings for
health care, such as Medicare in the U.S. By taxing the young for the care of
the elderly, such programs extend life beyond that which would be observed
in a free market. Private savings may therefore be increased to finance a
longer life in old age.
Furthermore, life-extending savings programs such as Medicare interact
positively with other programs dependent on the length of life, such as Social
Security. Thus, if the co-payment rate for Medicare were lowered, then this
would presumably raise Social Security outlays through longer living. The
incentives of life-extension imply a feed-back effect in the opposing direction
as well: if annuity levels rise, the increases in medical care would take place.
This feed back, in turn, would raise the annuity outlays even more. In other
words, not only does subsidizing health care increase expenditures on social
security by extending life, but expanding social security also increases health
care outlays by raising the income rewards for living. Moreover, this feedback
‘The extreme form of a private demand for transfers away from sick states is through
so called advance diTectiues, which limit medical care in disabling states, many times to
secure bequests.
~There is a substantial literature on the effects of the low substitutability of non-pension
and pension savings. Cagan (1965) and Katona (1965) show that the extensive margin,
whether having pensions or not, affects non-pension savings positively. Green (1981) and
King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) document these effects on the intensive margin as well,
and Poterba et al. (1996) find these effects robust to controlling for individual fixed effects
and a range of potential substitutes.
3arises for empirically relevant parameters in the US. In particular, Tengs et
al. (1995) review about 500 studies on interventions to extend life and find
that the median total cost for extending life by one year was about $20,000.
Subsidized at a Medicare rate of 80%, this would imply a cost of about $4,000,
which is far below the annual Social Security benefits for many individuals. a
We show in section 4 how the incentives of life-extension affect the demand
for annuities and argue that non-indexed annuities, where real income falls
wit h length of life, may involve efficiency gains by discouraging life-extension.
Due to the life-extension feedbacks of annuities, the competitive pricing of
them implies that unit prices rise with quantity. We illustrate how to measure
such feedback effects of public annuities using aggregate data from a public
pension program in the US, The Civil Service Ret’iTement System (CSRS).
Finally, section 6 concludes.
Our results imply that the advantages of annuities, and therefore the case
for them being provided by the public sector, have been overstated.g The
case has been made in models of exogenous mortality, but those models fail
to explain the large amount of medical care devoted towards life-extension
and therefore only consider the advantages of annuities in insuring against
depletion of savings. By expanding the domain of a relatively scarce litera-
ture on the determinants of endogenous lifetime (see, e.g., Grossman (1972),
Ehrlich and Chums (1990), and especially Rosen (1989, 1995)), we show
how the traditional analysis is altered when mortality contingent claims af-
fect mortality,
2 Rational Life-Extension and Annuities
This section sets out the basic incentives that are important for life-extension
when wealth is tied to length of life through mort ality contingent claims.
2.1 Mortality Contingent Claims Under Certainty
We consider a non-working retired individual with an increasing and strictly
concave instant aneous utility function U(c). Consider allocating a lump-sum
8Moreover, in the US private pensions increase the benefit, and Medigap coverage
reduces the cost in this tradeoff.
‘See e.g., the classic article by Yaari (1965).
4of retirement wealth W over a remaining life of T years after retirement. The
indirect utility V(W, T) obtained by optimally choosing consumption subject
to the wealth constraint is
V(W, T) = Maz. J:o~(.(~))e-”’~~
subject to
T
J () c t e-”dt < W,
t=o
where ~ is the discount rate throughout, assumed to be equal to the interest
rate. The solution to the consumption problem in this case is well known;
it involves perfect consumption smoothing in the sense of equalizing yearly
consumption levels. The lump-sum wealth is split equally across years to
give the annual consumption level c(t) = W/A[T], where A[T] is the present
value of a security paying one-dollar every year until T, 10 Substituting in
the annual consumption level yields
V(W, T) = A[T]U(~).
This implies that the length of life is complementary to wealth (i.e., VTW > O)
because the poorer is the individual, the less does he consume when extending
life. Put more simply, if one runs out of savings, one does not have much of
a life to extend.
Denote by M the resources devoted towards extending life, which includes
not only medical care (e. g., hospital and physician services), but also other
resources such as dietary expenditures, home care outlays, and time transfers
from children or a spouse. If such care extends life according to the weakly
increasing and concave technology T(M), it introduces a tradeoff between
the quantity and quality of life as represented by years lived T and annual
consumption c.11 Yearly consumption falls when investing in life-extension
because less wealth is spread over more years. If this is represented by the
l“This value is determined by A[T] = ~t~oe–’tdt.
1lThis technological relationship relates to the frequently estimated quantities of ‘life-
years-saved’ of medical interventions (see, e.g., World Bank (1993) and Tengs et al.
(1995)). In order to maintain the focus on life-extension, we do not consider more elaborate
health production functions.
5overall utility V(W— M, T(M)), the demand for care balances the value from
extending life to the loss in quality of life from foregone consumption spent
on care:
VTTM = VW
For a mortality contingent claim, we denote by W(T) the wealth that is
associated with a given lifetime T. This now implies the indirect utility
V(W(T(M)) – M, T(M)), and the demand for life-extending resources has
now been altered. The necessary first-order condition is now
T~[VwWT + VT] = VW,
The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of extra resources devoted to life-
extension. Now, however, this is not only made up of the direct effect of
enjoyment of living, but also the indirect effect of income cent ingent on living
(i.e., the mortality contingent claim). The right-hand side is, as before, the
marginal cost of foregone consumption due to life-extending care.
The point is not that individuals may make a profit from living, but rather
that the marginal benefit of life-extension has been increased, Consider the
case of partial annuitization,lz when the overall wealth is given by the non-
annuitized wealth, Y., together with the amount of annual annuity earning,
YI, multiplied by the number of years lived,
W(T) = Y, + YIT.
In this case, the marginal wealth impact of life-extension equals the annual
annuity pay: WT = Y1. When annuitized, the individual does not have to
about financing future years of living because the quality-quantity tradeoff
has been altered. To illustrate, consider the annual consumption level when
fully annuitized (Y. = O), as in
Y,T(M) – M ~ y, _ M
c(t) =
T(M) T(M) “
The yearly consumption level is now made up of the annuity income, less
the yearly care used to extend life. The key point is that life-extension is
12We here focus on the ex-post decision, when the annuity is provided through a Pay-
A.s-You-Go program, but we later consider private markets for annuities in which life-
extending efforts are priced out,
6cheap because extending life generates more annuity receipts to finance the
life-extending care. Indeed, if T(M) is elastic, then both the quantity and
quality of life increase with care. The individual lives longer and enjoys more
consumption when extending life. 13
These annuity incentives imply that, holding overall wealth constant, life-
extension is excessive relative to lump-sum savings when annuitized. Figure
1 below indicates the opportunity sets in terms of feasible combinations of
wealth and lifetime (W, T) for a non-annuitized and an annuitized individual.
The annuitized opportunity set ranges from (YO + YIT(0), T(O)), when all
wealth is consumed, to (O, T(M), when all wealth is allocated towards life-
extension and ~ is the maximum feasible level of care defined by annuity
revenues equaling care outlays, Y. + Y1T(m) — ~ = O. More wealth has
to be given up for an extra year of life when there are no annuities because
life-extension is not wealth generating. This implies that the slope of the
frontier of feasible wealth and life-length combinations is steeper for the non-
annuitized individual.
Now consider the optimal combination when annuitized, as denoted by
(WA, T~). If the individual faces the lump-sum tradeoff, as given by the non-
annuit ized opportunity set, then he will reduce life-extension and increase
consumption by choosing (WN, Z’~) instead of (WA, TA). The fact that the
two opportunity sets cross at the optimal annuity combination means that the
lump-sum wealth is the same as that of the annuitized individual. In other
words, the difference in life-extending care is not due to wealth. The tradeoff
that is less steep, in terms of foregone wealth when annuitized, naturally
makes him shift towards greater quantity, relative to quality of life: the
distorted life-length under the annuity is TA – TN.
laNaturall~,~~ discussed below, this gets priced out in a private annuitY market in
terms of larger premia. It may even be that without commitment devices, such as caps on
Medicare outlays, a private annuity market breaks down. This would be the case when a
life-support machine could be financed by Social Security, leaving some residual amount
of resources left over, perhaps for the partner of the life-extender.
72.2 Mortality Contingent Claims Under Uncertainty
The same incentives are present under uncertainty, when annuities and other
mortality contingent claims fill the important role of insuring against deple-
tion of savings. Let uncertainty be represented by a set of health states h =
1,2,.. , H, where health states represent a given disease or illness condition.14
Under a lump-sum claim that pays off Wh in state h, the individual devotes
resources ~h under the incentives discussed in the previous section. The
ex-ante problem is therefore to allocate state contingent wealth W~ to solve
~a~ ~ ~hV(W, – ~~(W~), T~(~h(Wh.))) s.~, ~X~Wh < W,
h=l
where ~(Wh) is the demand for life-extending resources in a state, m~ is
the probability of the state occurring, and W is ex-ante wealth. The pure
insurance benefit of an annuity is well known, and is the exclusive focus
of discussions concerning exogenous mortality. It applies in our case when
life-extension efforts are completely unproductive, so that dTh/a~h = O, im-
plying that no resources are given up for care, ~h = O. In this case, the famil-
iar condition for optimal insurance requires that all gains from trade across
states are exploited, implying that annual consumption levels without life-
extending care are equalized across states at the level Wh/AITh(l))]. Hence,
an annuity providing this consumption guarantees optimal consumption, 15
The lz’’e-ezpectancy under state-contingent care M ~ (Ml, ... MH) is
Annuities makes such life-expectancy excessive relative to lump-sum pay,
even when they serve the role of insuring against depleted savings. More
precisely, for any annuity contract, there exists a state-contingent claim of
equal present value under which life-expectancy is loweTed but individuals aTe
bette~ oH. To show this in a similar way to the deterministic case, for an
annuity of size Y, let the state contingent wealth under annuity-dependent
care Mb(Y) be denoted by
~h = Th(Mh(y))y.
14For example, those classified by DRGs under Medicare in the U.S.
15Formally, this follows from the marginal indirect utility of wealth given by Vw =
U’(Wh /AITh(0)]), which, together with the first order condition fihv~ = mh~ (where } is
the Lagrange multiplier), yields that Wh/A[T~ [0] is equal across states.
8Since annuities increase the marginal benefit of life-extension, we know that
the life-extending resources under the annuity are larger than under lump-
sum pay: M(Y) > M(W~). Therefore, for all states, receiving the lump-sum
wealth Wh requires the same expenditures ex-ante, ~ nhW~ = E[T IM(Y)]Y,
but less- life extension in each state. This reduction in life-extending care
relative to annuities makes the individual better off in each state but reduces
life expect ancy,
EITIM(Y)] > EITIM(W)].
In sum, annuities involve excessive life-extension relative to complete, state
cent ingent contracts, even when they are serving the role of insurance against
depleted savings. The effect discussed here is that observed when holding
wealth constant, but equally important may be the effect that occurs due to
the wealth effects generated by public transfers across generations.
The excess extension of annuities relative to lump-sum pay is particularly
important when utility is state-dependent, in the sense that the marginal
benefit from income is positively related to health so that income is less
valuable when sick. This is because annuities are only mortality contingent,
and not morbidity or health contingent. If Yh(T) is the amount of the an-
nuity in health state h under life-length T, this is represented by the health
incompleteness Y~(T) = Yh,(T). When income is valued more when healthy,
other things constant, the individual would want more resources when in good
health, rather than bad health. This is the opposite transfer of traditional
health insurance, which is actually ‘sick insurance’. If better health increases
the marginal utility of income, there are gains from trade across future health
states, when the utility loss from the foregone income when sick is less than
the utility gain of the same income when healthy. However, since annuities
are not health-dependent, there are excess resources when sick, which are
therefore devoted to life-extension: a sick individual with a large annuity has
nothing else to spend it on other than excessive medical care. Consider two
health states, sick and healthy, denoted h = O and h = 1 representing sick
and healthy, and let (Yo, Y1) be the hypothetical annuity amounts held in the
two morbidity states. Assume that life-extension is only productive when
sick, in which case any redistribution away from the sick state towards the
healthy state reduces the overall life-expectancy,
EITIYO, Y,] = 7roT(Mo(yo)) + ~l~(~l(fi)).
9Life-extending care in the sick state is larger, the larger is the annuity and
the larger is the loss in marginal utility of consumption from sickness. Even
if the productivity of life-extension under a treatment is very low, substantial
expenditures may be made because the value of the income foregone is also
low when sick. This will often imply that optimal demand for the annuity
that is complete with respect to morbidity requires Y1 > Yo, which is impos-
sible for incomplete annuities requiring Y1 = Y. and, hence, longer living in
this case.
2.3 Life-Extension In Altruistic Families
There may be several people investing in one person’s life, as would be the
case, for example, if children are longer living or a younger wife invests in
the life-extension of a husband. The investments may be made in cash but
also in-kind, the latter taking place through shared housing or time trans-
fers. Although out-of-pocket expenses are non-trivial for individuals above
65,16 the largest component of private resources appear to be actual time
allocated towards private care, whet her by children, spouses, or the person
herself,17 Under multi-person life-extension, principal-agent issues arise when
the person whose life is being extended is not undertaking the costly care.
The important point here is that mortality contingent claims may affect the
degree to which the preferences of the agent and the dependent principal line
up, in particular when the agent is altruistic towards the principal.la
Consider the common case of a male annuity of size Y~, which has survival
benefit to the female of Sf, in which case the after care wealth under no
discounting is
W = YmTm + Max{ Sf(Tf – Tin), O} – Mm – Mf.
160ut_of_pocket ~xPenditures constituted more than 20 perCent of income for more ‘ban
10 percent of elderly in 1977 and 1987 in the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey
(NMES) (see Taylor and Banthin (1994)).
lTShroeni and McGarry (1995) discuss evidence concerning the magnitude of such time
transfers in a recent US survey.
16The extreme, but illustrative, version of this argument is the routine investigation of
life-insurance beneficiaries in homicide cases.
10The effect on it of extending the life of the male is thus
which derives from the fact that an extra year of male living generates one
more year of annuity pay, but, if the male is outlived by the female, one less
year of survivor benefits. Therefore, life-insurance of the female lowers the
19 Dependent on the altruism of the female income gain from life-extension.
spouse, the observed under-insurance of widows may provide an efficiency
gain in generating male life-extension. We would expect couples with more
altruism, perhaps as reflected by a longer duration of marriage, to more fully
insure the wife against the death of the husband because in more altruistic
couples less of an income motive is needed.
More generally, when more than one life is extended, let V(W, Tm, Tf)
denote the indirect utility for a given family wealth and given lifetimes of
the male and female, defined similarly to the single-life case.20 It is the
value of optimal consumption for a given wealth level and length of life of
both partners in the couple. When there is no discounting and differential
annuities of size Y~ for the male and Yt for the female, the total wealth is
W = YmTm+YfTf –Mm –Mf.
The marginal effects of life-extension on wealth are, in this case, simply Ym
and Yi for the male and female. This can easily be shown to imply that, even
though there may no gender interaction in the effectiveness of medical care
on life-extension, more expenditures are made on the male when his annuity
is larger.21
lgNote that this implies that providing survival benefits to public and private annuities
may have small, or even negative,effects on total annuity outlays dependent on the relative
size of the increase in outlays on the agent and the decrease in outlays on the principal.
20More precisely, it may be defined according to
V(W, Tm, Tf) s Maz a ~t~~Uf (cf (t))e-rtdt + (1 – a) ~t~~ U~(cm(t))e-rtdt subject to
~~f cf(t)e-’tdt + ~Tm ~=o c~(t)e–rtdt < W, where a is the relative weight of the female.
2~Consequently, pharmaceuticals should be expected to tailor research towards the fem-
inist agenda as the annuity levels across genders converge.
113 Aggregate Implications for Public Savings
and Health
This section considers the non-standard interactions between public and pri-
vate savings under endogenous life-extension when the public program is
financed in a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) manner, as well as the interactions
that occur between such public savings programs and those programs for
health.
We consider the effects of a PAYG-financed mandatory annuity program
under no discounting. Let L and T denote the total years of work and retire-
ment, where the first is assumed exogenous but the second is affected by our
discussed life-extension incentives. Consider a population where each indi-
vidual lives L + T years, With a stationary level of fertility of N individuals
born every year, the age distribution is stationary with N individuals in ev-
ery age cohort. At every period, the total number of workers is therefore NL
and the total number of retired individuals is NT, with the corresponding
dependency ratio for the population (i.e., number of non-workers per worker)
6 = NT/NL. Let the yearly after-tax earnings be W(I – ~) during working
years, and let the annuity level and medical care in retirement be Y and
M(Y), so that when total life-time income is smoothed out over all years of
living this gives the annual consumption level
~ = LW(l – T)+ TY– M(Y)
L+T
= p(Y)w(l – T) + [1 – p(Y)]Y – m(Y),
where m(Y) - M(Y)/(L + T) is the medical care smoothed out over time
and p(Y) ~ L/(L + T) = 1/(1 + J(Y)) is the fraction of life spent working
and is a negative function of the dependency ratio. Annual consumption net
of care is thereby determined by the wedge between working and retirement
income. The implied savings S during working years is given by
s = W(I –7) – c = (1 – /o(Y) )[w(l – 7) – Y] +?-rL(Y).
To smooth income, savings increase with the number of retirement years
to be financed relative to working years, with the gap between working and
retirement income, and with the amount of old age medical care. If the PAYG
Social Security program is balanced, then we have that the tax-rate T(Y) is
12implicitly defined by the annuity level Y when revenues of the program equal
its expenditures, as in
NWT(Y)L = NTY + T(Y) = 6(Y)(;).
This implies that when the dependency ratio depends positively on the the
annuity level, d6/dY 2 0, the increase in taxes needed to finance an increase
in the level of annuity income is strengthened, because, in addition to sim-
ply requiring larger funds holding the age distribution constant, annuities
increase the number of individuals eligible to receive payments,
dr 7(Y) + d6(Y) Y
dY= W
y(~) 20.
Using this effect of annuities on taxes, the effect of raising the mandatory
annuity level on savings is given by
: =(1 -p(Y) )[w(-$) -1] - #[w(l -T) - Y]+:.
The first negative effect is induced by the reduction in the gap between
pre- and post-retirement income. The second positive effect is non-standard
and results from the change in the age distribution caused by the increased
incentives of life-extension generated by the annuity increase. Savings in-
crease because the person will live longer when incentives for life-extension
are increased. The third effect is positive as well and is due to the increased
medical care induced by a larger incentive to extend life. This implies that
a mandatory annuity program may have a low, or even positive, impact on
private savings. The complement arity between public and private savings,
or private pensions and private savings outside pensions, has been shown
to be of empirical importance but is inconsistent with traditional life-cycle
analysis .22 As this analysis shows, however, this conclusion is due to ex-
ogenous mortality; if life-extension is affected by the piece-rates for living
induced by annuities, a complement arity between public and private savings
may be present.
Zzseethe references in the introduction.
133.1 Public Annuity and Health Care Programs
Subsidization of medical care interacts in important ways with the discussed
incentive effects of annuities. Most public health subsidy programs seem to
amount to mandatory health care savings since relatively larger taxes are
levied on the working young and relatively larger subsidies are paid to the
sicker old. Our results imply that public mandatory medical savings may
be complementary with private savings. To determine the savings effects
of subsidizing life-extending medical care, let ~ denote the fraction of care
subsidized, and consider a demand function for medical care as a function
of health subsidies and annuity benefits M(j, Y) such that, ceteris paribus,
it responds positively to both incentives for care: dM/d’, dM/dY 2 0. The
central aspect of such subsidies is that they interact positively with the excess
extension of life induced by annuities, since the medical costs to be spread
across years of living are reduced. In other words, the larger are the medical
care subsidies, the larger is the discussed incentive effect of annuities, since
the annuities drive the benefit of extension and subsidies lower the cost of
such extension. Therefore, they may interact positively, so that the annuity
effect on medical care is determined by the level of the subsidy: d2M/djdY 2
0. Suppose that the budget for medical care and Social Security is balanced,
as in
NT[M(f, Y)f + Y] = NLW~,
with the previous special case of no public medical care being obtained when
~ = O. The tax rate that finances both the health and Social Security
programs is determined by
T(f, Y) =
Increasing medical subsidies or
M(f, Y)f + Y
6(f, Y) ~ .
annuities has two positive effects on the tax
rate, one being the direct effect due to increased expenditures under a con-
stant age distribution and the other being the indirect effect through the ag-
ing of the population under increased intent ives for life-extension: ~f, ~Y z O.
By arguments similar to those made above, the annual consumption level un-
der the two programs is
~ = LW(l –~)+TY–(1 –f)M(f, Y)
L+T
J
14with the corresponding savings per year worked
s = W(I – T)– c = (1 – p(f, Y))[w(l –T(f, Y)) – y] +~(f, y),
where m(j, Y) s (1–~)~($, Y)/(L+T) is the non-subsidized part of medical
expenditure smoothed out over time. The effect of increasing the medical
subsidy on savings is therefore
$ =(1 -P(Y) )W(-$) - $[W(l -T)-Y] +;.
The first two terms are similar to before: the direct negative savings is due
to lower after-tax earnings and the positive effect is due to increased life-
extension under medical subsidies. The second effect is again through the
change in the age distribution. The third and last term reflects how much
medical expenditures increase due to the increase in the subsidy; it may
be positive or negative, depending on whether or not medical care is elastic.
This implies that an increase in medical subsidies during old age may increase
private savings. Indeed, this may even be true if the lifetime is exogenous,
since if the rise in the subsidy increases outlays, then more money is needed
during old age.
The interesting fact is that the two programs interact in total outlays.
When mortality is endogenous, medical subsidies affect annuity outlays since
productive medical care implies that an individual must be paid on his annu-
ity longer: if the co-payment rate for Medicare in the U.S. were to be lowered,
then Social Security outlays would presumably increase. Furthermore, there
are indirect effects in the opposite direction as well. If annuity levels were
to be increased, then medical care expenditures would increase as well, due
to the increased benefit of life-extension when annuities raise the income re-
wards for living. 23 More precise y, 1 the first effect of medical subsidies on the





Zaour ~rgument~ are based on the substitution effects generated by the interactions
between these programs in a stationary age distribution. Of equal importance may also be
the wealth effect induced by richer old people that is generated by programs that transfer
resources between age cohorts under a non-stationary age distribution. For example, if
younger cohorts pay relatively more for their annuities than older ones in the U.S., and if
medical care is a normal good, then Social Security may increase medical care relatively
more for the older generation than for the younger generation.
15and is due to the fact that larger outlays occur when people live longer. The
second effect that Social Security outlays have on medical care is due to the
larger life-extension intent ives, as in
d(NfTM) dM dT
dY
= Nf[Tm + ~M] 20.
4 Implications for Private Mortality Con-
tingent Claims Markets
This section discusses the implications of our arguments for private markets
for mortality contingent claims in terms of limiting the life-extension induced
by annuities and the price effects of such incentives.
4.1 Efficiency and Indexation
In competitive insurance markets, where prices are driven down to minimum
average costs, fair prices obtain. Consider the illustrative case of no discount-
ing when the price p(Y, M) of an annuity of size Y under care M is given
by
P(Y, M) = ~nhTh(Mh)Y = YEITIM].
This is simply quantity times the unit price equalling the life-expectancy of
the demander. The classic moral hazard problem induced by annuities is
that the harm imposed on those paying the premium by life-extension is not
internalized. In particular, at the time of life-extension, this is determined
by the indirect utility V(YTh – Mh – p, Th) without taking into account the
efleci on the premium p. Optimal care balances, as before, the benefit from
income and living against the cost in foregone consumption, as in
~[vwY + v,] = Vw.
On the other hand, the socially efficient level of care is determined by taking
into account how the annuity price is affected by this same change in care,
as in
~[vwY + v, - Vw] =
‘h dMh
&~Tkvw.
16This balances the social benefits of those that end up in the health state (the
left-hand side) with the social cost it imposes on others in terms of a larger
premia (the right-hand side). Since private incentives imply that the left-
hand side is zero, efficient provision reduces life-extension in order to avoid
the negative external effects it has on others paying the premia.
Private markets may internalize such external effects. The efficient ‘tax’
on life-extenders makes them pay the marginal harm imposed on all premium
payers. If 13~is the tax-rate, then 13~M~is the Pigouvian tax bill for life-
extending care. It should be set to equate the social cost with the social
benefit above, as in
This is the harm (on the margin) imposed on those not ending up in the state
by the premium increase induced by their life-extending care. A method of
mimicking this tax on unobservable care would be through decreasing the
income rewards of life-extension through a non-indexed annuity in which the
real annual pay fell with the length of life. A lack of indexing would discrim-
inate e within a given cohort, in cent rast to conventional age discrimination in
annuity premia which operates across cohorts .24
4.2 Competitive Pricing
The conventional analysis in which care is unproductive and mortality ex-
ogenous implies linear pricing; that is, unit prices do not change with the
quantity of annuities purchased since life-expectancy is unaffected. On the
other hand, consider the case when the distribution of lifetimes on a higher
quantity of annuities dominates one of a lower quantity in the first-order
24More precisely, when the annuity is not indexed, it pays out the decreasing real annual
pay fraction R(T)Y at age T, where O < R(T) < 1 and RT <0. The marginal condition
ex-post at the time of care therefore becomes
~[VwY[l + R,] + V,]= Vw,
which reduces the marginal benefit of life-extension since the factor [1 + RT] is less than
unity, the value it takes when indexed.
17sense. In this case, unit prices pu s p/Y rise with quantity, as in
dpu _ dEITIM(Y)] > ~,
dY– dY –
In other words, prices are non-linear: unit prices rise with quantity as it raises
the life-extension and consequently the outlays of the insurer; the larger is
the annuity effect on survival, the larger is the positive effect of quantity on
unit price.
Unfair pricing above expected claims may make unit prices fall with quan-
tity. However, there would still be different predictions between exogenous
and endogenous mortality. In particular, assume that prices satisfy
where ~ = (~o, ~1) are fixed and variable costs adding to the premia beyond
just expected claims. This implies the unit price
Now, under exogenous mortality, unit prices fall with quantity as the fixed
costs are spread over a larger sized contract:
dEITIM(Y)] = o ~ dpu < ~
dY dY –
On the other hand, under elastic endogenous mortality, there exists a quan-
tity A above which unit prices are rising, although they may be falling ini-




Furthermore, two observable groups that differ in the size of the incentive
effect will have different relationships between unit price and quantity, al-
though not necessarily a positive one. For example, as the life expectancy
of a young cohort is less elastic than that of an older one, we predict a
posit ive age interaction on the quantity-unit price relationship; prices for
ZsThi~ follows directly from the expression for ~.
18older cohorts have larger effects of quantity on unit price, even though the
relationship may not be positive, due to fixed costs.
our life-extension incentives imply that prices for so called guaranteed
annuities have predictable price differences relative to standard annuities.
Such annuities guarantee an annual pay of Y for at least TO years, after
which the annuity works in the standard way. This mortality contingent
claim differs from a standard annuity in that the marginal benefit from life-
extension is lowered. The price of a guaranteed annuity would be
If the survival function under the two contracts were the same, the difference
in total price between the regular and guaranteed annuity would be
PG(Y) – P(Y)= Y ~:(1 -S(i))dt.
This is because the guaranteed annuity is like paying a regular annuity to an
individual that lives with certainty during the guarantee period. However,
relative to the normal annuity, the marginal effect of life-extension is lower
under a guaranteed annuity, which consequently implies that the premium
for a guarantee should be less than the difference above, due to the reduction
in life-extension under guaranteed income.
Finally, the same arguments can be used to predict the premium for
indexing. Our incentives imply that indexing should affect unit prices in
predictable ways. In particular, indexing should increase the cost of annuities
more than the expected cost of inflation since it implies larger incentives to
extend life.
4.3 Measuring The Feed-Back Effect of Annuities
This section illustrates how to empirically assess the feedback effects of an-
nuities using standard aggregate data generated by an annuity roll. We use
data reported in Virga (1996) on the public pension program covering federal
employees in the U.S. who were hired before 1983, The Civil Service Retire-
ment System ( CSRS). Figure 2 below shows survival functions for groups
differing in the amount of monthly annuity pay they received while on that
pension roll. The data cover the fiscal years 1988-94 and are differentiated
by five levels of monthly annuity levels.
19The annuities under CSRS are indexed relative to the CPI and are manda-
tory so that selection-issues are presumably of minor importance.2G The sizes
of these annuities are relatively large, as they combine Social Security and a
federal employee pension program. The data report ed in Virga (1996) were
presented in terms of yearly mortality hazard rates on the annuity role rep-
resent ed by CSRS across salary and annuity cells, with exceptionally large
cell sizes ranging from about 1500 to 1.8 million. The data show that yearly
mortality hazards fall with annuity level and salary, each falling when con-
trolling for the other. The lowest yearly hazard rates are about one-half
of the highest, across all cells. We used these hazard rates to compute the
27 The plotted sur- annuity-dependent survival curves reported in the figure.
vivals are for males, conditional on reaching age 57, and they display the
positive relationship between annuity pay and survival discussed above.
Although these patterns may, of course, be confounded, the data reported
by Virga show that they hold controlling for gender and salary levels, as well.
However, the key point of these survivals is to illustrate how relatively small
differences in survivals may nevertheless lead to relatively large incentive
effects. To compute these incentive effects, we decomposed the price increase
of an annuity due to an increase in quantity into two components: one holding
unit price constant and the other holding quantity constant, as in
alp(Y) = p~(Y)dY + Ydp~(Y),
Dividing through by the increase in the total annuity value, the relative
contributions are obtained, as in
~ = Ydp~(Y) + p~(Y)dY
alp(Y) alp(Y) “
We call the first term the incentive component of the increase in the annuity
value resulting from the increase in the unit price and the second term the
quantity component resulting from the increase in the quantity alone.
“Even under voluntary demand, Cawley and Philipson (1996) present evidence that
supports that selection on the demand side does not occur on private information about
mortality in life-insurance markets.
27More precisely, we used a linear spline approximation h(t IY) to compute the yearly
hazards using the reported hazard rates in 5 year intervals, and then compute the discrete
time survival function according to S(tlY) = ~~=o(l – h(slY)).
20Figure 3 below plots the size of the incentive component for different
increases in the quantity. The three curves corresponds to three separate
quantity increases from YL= $500 per month to YH = $1250, $1750, and
$2500 per month. The figure reports the first incentive component using the
annuity dependent survival functions of Figure 2.
A given curve corresponds to a given pair (Y~, YH) before and after the
quantity increase, and each curve is plotted against the x-axis representi~g
the age at which the annuity starts. For example, the top curve indicates
that if an annuity starts at age 70 then the incentive component in raising the
quantity from $500 to $2500 per month is about 18 percent. In other words, of
the increase in the annuity value that occurs when increasing the quantity, 18
percent is attributable to the increase in longevity due to the larger annuity.
The feedback effects illustrated by the non-trivial incentive effects in these
aggregate data suggest that a more careful empirical examination of the
relationship between life-extension and public annuity expenditures may be
warrant ed.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the savings and health care impact of mort ality contingent claims,
under which income earned is contingent on one’s length of life. We stress
the incentive effects of such mortality contingent claims on resources de-
voted to extend life. We discuss the effects that such claims have on savings
and resources devoted to life-extension and argue, among other things, that
life-extension is excessive under mandatory annuity programs such as Social
Security; that public savings may increase private savings; that there may be
an annuity-based gender bias in medical care; and that the lack of insurance
of wives against the deaths of their husbands may have an efficiency basis.
We further discussed the non-linear pricing of mortality contingent claims,
the efficiency gains of not indexing annuities, and the important interactions
between public subsidies for health and savings, interactions which are absent
in models with exogenous mortality. Overall, we argue that the insurance
aspects of mortality contingent claims have been overemphasized, relative to
their incentives for resources devoted to life-extension through medical care.
21Our arguments may imply important differences with the standard theory
of Ricardian equivalence. It is claimed there that inter-generational trans-
fers have no real effects if children are altruistic towards parents or parents
towards children. This is not necessarily true under endogenous mortality. If
parents support children because they are altruistic, they have no artificial
intent ive to extend their lives. But if children support parents, our arguments
show that there may be excessive investment in health. Moreoverj if income
is redistributed from parents to children, Ricardian equivalence says this has
no effect, regardless of which one is altruistic. But if children are altruistic,
such a redistribution will raise the incentive to invest in life-extension by
parents.
Finally, although our discussion concerned the impact of annuities on
mortality, this may not be the only channel through which annuities affect
age distributions. If children and annuities are substitutes for old age income
and health support, then mandatory annuities naturally lower the demand
for children so that annuities may not only have effects on mortality but also
on fertility. The overall impact of mandatory public annuity programs on the
more recent part of the demographic transition, namely the postwar reduc-
tions in both mortality and fertility rates, therefore remains an important
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